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Abstract 
 
There is evidence that attentional control mechanisms in humans can be boosted in 
performance contexts involving the presence of other human agents, compared with isolation. 
This phenomenon was investigated here with the presence of artificial agents, that is, 
humanoid robots in the context of the well-known Stroop task requiring attentional control 
for successful performance. We expected and found beneficial effects of robotic presence 
(compared with isolation) on standard Stroop performance and response conflict resolution (a 
specific component of Stroop performance) exclusively when robotic presence triggered 
anthropomorphic inferences based on prior verbal interactions with the robot (a social robot 
condition contrasted with the presence of the same robot without any prior interactions). 
Participants' anthropomorphic inferences about the social robot actually mediated its 
influence on attentional control, indicating the social nature of this influence. These findings 
provide further reasons to pay special attention to human-robot interactions and open new 
avenues of research in social robotics. 
 
 
Key-words: Social facilitation; Anthropomorphized robots; Human robot interaction; 
Cognitive control; Stroop task  
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1 Introduction 
Humanoid robots might become more and more present in the most ordinary contexts 
of millions people worldwide, a plausible projection given the increasing attention of social 
robotics to the cognitive, interactive, and affective skills of robots designed to live with 
humans [1, 2]. While tremendous progress has been made in this area, the influence that the 
mere presence of humanoid robots may have on human cognition itself remains poorly 
understood. There is evidence both in adults [3] and children [4] that the presence of a 
humanoid robot can lead to similar effects as human presence in terms of feelings [5] and 
task performance [3, 4]. However, these pioneering efforts overlooked both the attentional 
processes and anthropomorphic inferences (the attribution of human characteristics to non-
human animals or machines) that may be involved in the influence of robotic presence. Here, 
we take advantage of research on human presence and attention and argue that the presence 
of humanoid robots—even passive—may affect attentional processes as fundamental as 
conflict resolution in the Stroop task, at least when the robot being present is 
anthropomorphized to some extent. 
1.1 Brief review of earlier research on social presence effects 
Evidence accumulated for more than a century in experimental social psychology 
show a tendency for humans and nonhuman animals to perform differently on a myriad of 
motor and cognitive tasks when in the presence of conspecifics—other members of the same 
species—than when alone. Following Triplett’s [6] pioneering efforts on what is referred to 
as social facilitation/impairment (SFI) effects (for reviews see [7, 8, 9]), many researchers 
tried to make sense of seemingly contradictory results: whatever the species examined, the 
presence of conspecifics sometimes facilitates and sometimes impairs task performance. 
Zajonc [10]was the first to notice that the presence of observers or coactors typically 
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facilitates performance on easy or well-learned tasks, and impairs performance on difficult or 
poorly-learned tasks. Based on the Hull-Spence behaviorist theory of learning, conditioning, 
and motivation (well accepted in the 50s and 60s) [11], Zajonc suggested that the mere 
presence of conspecifics increases arousal and, thereby, the frequency of dominant (habitual) 
responses. According to Hull-Spence, the energization of dominant responses indeed 
improves performance in well-learned tasks where, by definition, correct responses are 
dominant, and deteriorates it in poorly-learned tasks where errors are the most likely 
responses. Zajonc’s view of SFI effects found support in many studies using very different 
species, whose dominant responses—whether correct or incorrect—increased under social 
presence, compared with isolation. However, although Zajonc’s classic view remains the 
most common interpretation of SFI effects (see also [12] for a motivational account close to 
Zajonc’s solution), there is evidence that these effects also involve attentional mechanisms, at 
least in humans (e.g., [13-19]) and non-human primates [20, 21].  
Thirty years ago, Baron’s [13] distraction/conflict theory suggested the first 
integrative attentional view of SFI effects. The key idea is that social presence, when it is 
distracting or diverts attention away from the focal task, can create attentional conflict, a form 
of response conflict regarding what attentional response one should make (paying attention to 
the focal task vs. the person present). This conflict, in turn, may threaten the organism with 
cognitive overload and, ultimately, cause a restriction in attention focus. Ironically, attention 
focusing may produce just the task effects associated with the energization of dominant 
responses: facilitation of performance (by screening out nonessential stimuli) when the task is 
simple or requires attention to a small number of central cues, and impairment of 
performance (by neglecting certain crucial stimuli) when the task is more complex or 
demands attention to a wide range of cues.  
One strategy for differentiating the two hypotheses (attention focusing vs. dominant 
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response) is to use poorly-learned tasks that involve only a few key stimuli [13]. In this 
context, the attention focusing hypothesis predicts social facilitation whereas the dominant-
response hypothesis predicts social impairment. To this end, Huguet et al. [16] used the well-
known Stroop task [22, 23] requiring individuals to identify the color in which a word is 
printed, ignoring the word itself. Because of the automaticity of word reading [23, 24], 
identification times are consistently longer for color-incongruent words (the word “BLUE” in 
green ink) than for color-neutral items (“DESK” in green ink), a phenomenon typically 
referred to as standard Stroop interference. This interference indicates how difficult the 
control of attention can be when faced with competing, conflictual automatic activations. To 
the extent that word reading is the dominant tendency in Stroop’s paradigm, Zajonc's [10] 
solution predicts that social presence should increase Stroop interference. In contrast, if social 
presence leads to a restriction in attention focus, it should reduce Stroop interference (by 
focusing more exclusively on the letter color cues). Huguet et al. [16] provided first evidence 
that Stroop interference is reduced in contexts involving the presence of other human agents, 
either as observers or coactors [16, 25], compared with when participants perform the Stroop 
task alone. Reduced Stroop interference under social presence circumstances have since been 
replicated (e.g., [26–28], and its underlying mechanisms clarified, especially regarding which 
component of the interference is impacted.  
Recent studies have shown that Stroop interference is indeed a composite rather than 
unitary phenomenon, reflecting multiple processes and involving different types of conflicts: 
task conflict, semantic conflict, and response conflict (see [24, 29–32]). Task conflict is 
thought to arise because the individual’s attention is drawn by the irrelevant (i.e., word 
reading) activation instead of being fully focused on the relevant (i.e., color identification) 
task, leading the two processes to compete (e.g.,  [30, 31, 32]). Semantic conflict is thought to 
occur because the meaning of the word dimension and that of the color dimension are 
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simultaneously activated. Since they both corresponds to colors, the meaning activated by the 
irrelevant word dimension interferes with the meaning activated by the relevant color 
dimension, creating a delay in processing (e.g., [24, 28-30]). Response conflict is thought to 
arise because the incorrect (pre) motor response activated by the word dimension interferes 
with the correct (pre-)motor response activated by the color dimension [24, 30, 31]. This 
distinction is crucial to determine which of these three conflicts (task conflict, semantic 
conflict, or response conflict) is influenced by social presence.  
Augustinova and Ferrand [26] showed that social presence does not prevent semantic 
processing per se (word reading does occur), but boosts the control of attention at the later 
stage of response competition reflecting a reduction of response conflict specifically (for a 
similar conclusion see also [28]). Thus, there is evidence that Stroop performance is 
facilitated in the presence of others, a phenomenon reflecting a reduction of response conflict 
rather than task conflict or semantic conflict. Finally, although Baron’s [13] 
distraction/conflict theory assimilated attention focusing to an automatic response in case of 
attentional conflict, more recent findings suggest that it may also reflect improved cognitive 
control under the presence of others. Sharma et al. [28], for example, showed that reduced 
Stroop interference in social presence is prevented by using short response-to-stimulus 
intervals that are thought to reduce cognitive control processes. This is also consistent with 
the more general view that successful Stroop performance relies on executive attention, 
especially the deployment of top-down inhibitory control to refrain word reading to the 
benefit of color identification. All these findings do not necessarily invalidate Zajonc’s [10] 
classic theory, but indicate that attentional mechanisms also matter in SFI effects.  
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1.2 The present research 
 
In the present research, we used an extended semantic version of the Stroop task to 
specify which component of Stroop performance is influenced by robotic presence. This 
version allowed the measurement of all type of cognitive conflicts underlying Stroop 
interference (task conflict, semantic conflict, response conflict, as described earlier in this 
paper). This extended version comprised color-incongruent words (e.g., the word BLUE in 
green ink, i.e., BLUEgreen), color associated incongruent words (e.g., SKYgreen), color-neutral 
words (e.g., DOGgreen) and color-neutral letter-strings (e.g., XXXgreen). The inclusion of color-
neutral letter-strings (e.g., XXXgreen) allows the separation of task conflict from the two other 
conflicts: a significant difference in mean response time between color-neutral words and 
color-neutral letter-strings (e.g., DOGgreen ‒ XXXgreen) reflects differences in activation of the 
irrelevant reading task set (Task conflict per se). The inclusion of color associated 
incongruent words (e.g., SKYgreen) allows the separation of semantic conflict from the two 
other conflicts: a significant difference in mean response between color associated 
incongruent words and color-neutral words (e.g., SKYgreen ‒ DOGgreen) solely reflects the 
semantic conflict (with no response conflict). Finally, the standard color-incongruent words 
(e.g., BLUEgreen) allow a separation of response conflict from the two other conflicts: a 
significant difference in mean response between standard color-incongruent words and color 
associated incongruent words (e.g., BLUEgreen ‒ SKYgreen) solely reflects the response conflict 
occurring at the level of response processing (response conflict per se). 
In addition, we used a design which maximized anthropomorphic inferences in only 
one of two robotic conditions: a robot presence condition preceded by a verbal interaction 
with the robot (social robot condition) versus the presence of the same robot without any 
prior interaction (non-social robot condition). This strategy made it possible to determine 
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whether the beneficial effects of social robotic presence, if any, reflect the action of strictly 
mechanical distraction or more sophisticated, social-cognitive processes involving 
anthropomorphic inferences. We expected these beneficial effects to occur on Stroop 
performance exclusively in the social robot condition (maximizing anthropomorphic 
inferences), compared to when individuals perform the Stroop task alone or in presence of a 
non-anthropomorphized robot. When the robot is thought to have human characteristics, we 
reasoned, its presence may produce exactly the same effects as human presence [16, 26, 28]: 
Under this social robotic condition, the robot’s presence should cause a reduction of standard 
Stroop interference and a better resolution of response conflict specifically, compared to 
when the Stroop task is performed in isolation or in presence of a non-anthropomorphized 
robot. 
 
2 Method 
 
2.1 Participants 
Participants were 118 young adults (Mage = 19.24 years, SD = 1.32, 110 females and 8 
males) with normal (or corrected-to-normal) vision (39 in the Alone condition, 40 in the Non-
Social Robot condition, and 39 in the Social Robot condition). Sample size was determined—
as recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell [33]—on the basis of the desired power (.80), 
alpha level (.05), number of groups (three in the main analysis), and anticipated effect size 
based on human presence effects (using between-subjects design) in Stroop’s paradigm (η²p 
 
=.10; [16]). Using G*Power 3.1 [34], the minimum required sample size was calculated as 
90. 
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2.2 Procedure 
Participants performed the standard Stroop task twice (Session 1, Session 2). Each 
participant therefore was his/her own control for Stroop performance, which allowed to 
control for inter-individual differences on the Stroop task [35]. First (Session 1), participants 
performed the task alone (the experimenter left the room) then (Session 2) either alone or in 
presence of a robot (the experimenter left the room in all conditions). The robot was a 1-
meter Meccanoid
G15KS
 humanoid, as we assumed that even robots with a basic humanoid 
appearance can be anthropomorphized [36], at least under certain circumstances (see below). 
A 3-minutes break was inserted between the two Stroop sessions during which participants 
were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (Figure 1).  In the « non-social robot » 
condition (n = 40), participants were asked to give their opinion on the appearance of a 
physically present but passive robot as a means to provide data for unrelated projects with 
roboticists. In the « social robot » condition (n = 39), participants were asked to interact 
verbally with the same robot that was (unbeknownst to them) animated at distance by a 
human operator using two smartphones for the control of the robot’s gestures and speech (by 
selecting pre-established conversational scripts) in a coherent way (“Wizard of Oz 
paradigm”, [37]). This condition encouraged anthropomorphic inferences (see pre-test on 
anthropomorphic inferences below). The interaction always followed the same pre-
established script (Table 1), the operator having only to choose when to launch a given 
sequence. In the « alone » condition (n = 39), participants described a picture of a landscape, 
a task that occupied them the same amount of time as participants in the other two conditions.  
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Fig. 1 The design of the experiment was a 2 (Stroop task session 1, Stroop task session 2), x 4 
(Type of stimuli) x  3 (Performance context: Alone, presence of a non-social robot vs. social 
robot) 
 
Table 1 Verbal script used in the experiment 
Speaker Speech and behavior (into brackets) 
Experimenter Marvin, wake up! 
Robot Hello operator 
Experimenter Hello 
Robot 
Ah, I see there's a new person with you. Hello, my name is Marvin, 
and you, what's your name? 
 
(Robot turns towards the experimenter, then towards the subject) 
Participant … 
Robot  Nice to meet you, how are you doing today? 
 
(Robot lifts arms slightly while moving  head) 
Participant … 
Robot 
I am rather in a good mood today and I think I still have many people 
to meet 
 
(Robot nodding right side on the *I'm in a good mood * then gesture 
of the right hand and head centered on *I still have many people to 
meet*) 
Participants performed the 
Stroop task systematically alone 
(Session 1) 
Alone condition: 
Participants described a 
picture (landscape) 
Non-Social Robot 
condition: Participants 
described the robot 
Social Robot Condition: 
Participants interacted 
verbally with the robot 
Participants again 
performed the Stroop 
task alone (Session 2) 
Participants performed again the 
Stroop task in the passive presence of 
the robot (Session 2) 
Before Session 2, 
participants were randomly 
assigned to one of three 
conditions 
10 
Robot I'm curious, what are you doing in life? 
 
(Robot lifts arms slightly while moving your head) 
Participant … 
Robot I am a kind of assistant 
 
(Robot shakes the arms) 
 
And what are you listening to as music? 
 
(Robot raises the right forearm) 
Participant … 
Robot I do not have much data on it. Can you tell me more? 
 
(Robot lifts arms slightly while moving head) 
Participant … 
Robot Okay 
 
(Robot lifts arms slightly while moving head) 
 
I love discovering new things 
 
For example, people sent me music by email 
 
(Robot raises the left arm) 
 
Ah, I think the time we had for discussion is over. Could you call the 
operator? 
 
(Robot raises the right arm) 
Experimenter The experimenter returns to the experimental room 
Robot It was nice to talk with you 
 
(Robot raises arms slightly and pull them down) 
Experimenter Marvin, switch to silent mode please 
Robot Okay, understood 
  (Robot turns his head towards the experimenter) 
  Speaker Supplementary speech 
Robot sorry I did not understand 
Robot my email is marvin.psycho@gmail.com 
 
After the 3-min break, all participants again performed the Stroop task either alone (as 
before) or in presence of the non-social robot versus social robot. In the two robotic presence 
conditions, the robot was positioned in front of participants (to their right on the edge of their 
peripheral vision; see Figure 2) and watched them 60% of the time by turning the head 
according to a pre-established script (for a similar procedure with human presence, see [16]). 
The robot was piloted by two smartphones connected in Bluetooth. Movements were 
controlled by a Motorola Moto G 4G. Sounds were controlled by a LG optimus 2x connected 
to a JBL speaker. Both smartphones were powered by Android. Voices have been designed 
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with Voxal by NCH Software using the Pixie voice module. A hidden control camera was 
used to ensure a good control over movements and responses for the Wizard of Oz paradigm. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Experimental setting. 
2.2.1 Stroop task 
 EPrime 2.1 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh) running on a PC (Dell Precision) 
was used for Stroop stimulus presentation and data collection. The participants were seated 
approximately 50 cm from a 17-inch Dell color monitor. Their task was to identify the color 
of the letter-strings presented on the screen as quickly and accurately as possible while 
ignoring their meanings. To this end, the participants were instructed to fixate the white cross 
(“+”), which appeared in the center of the (black) screen for 500 ms. The cross was then 
replaced by a letter-string that continued to be displayed until the participant responded (or 
until 3500 ms had elapsed). After this response, a new stimulus appeared on the screen, again 
Operator’s room 
Voice control 
Experimenter’s room 
Robot 
Control Camera 
Participant 
30° 
60 cm 
. 
3.65 m 
3
 m
 
 
Movement  
control 
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replacing the fixation point and beginning the next trial. The response-stimulus interval was 1 
s [28]. The participants responded using a keyboard placed on a table between the participant 
and the monitor. The keys were labeled with colored stickers, with key “1” representing red, 
key “2” representing green, key “3” representing “blue” and key “4” representing “yellow”. 
Before the beginning of the experimental block in the first Stroop session, the participants 
practiced learning which key on the keyboard represented each color (key-matching practice 
trials). In these 128 practice trials, strings of asterisks presented in the four colors (e.g., ***, 
***) were used (instead of the experimental stimuli, see above). 
In order to assess the respective contribution of the different conflicts (task conflict, 
semantic conflict, and response conflict) involved in overall Stroop interference, four types of 
stimuli were used: standard color-incongruent words (e.g., BLUE in green), associated color-
incongruent words (e.g., SKY in green), color-neutral words (e.g, DOG in green), and color-
neutral letter strings (e.g., XXX in green; see [30] for presentation parameters). The different 
conflicts were computed as follows [30]: task conflict (RTs for color-neutral words minus  
RTs for color-neutral letter strings), semantic conflict (RTs for associated color-incongruent 
words minus RTs for color-neutral words), response conflict (RTs for standard color-
incongruent words minus RTs for associated color-incongruent words), standard Stroop 
interference (RTs for standard color-incongruent words minus RTs for color-neutral words).  
2.2.2 Attitudes toward robots 
At the end of the experiment, participants in the two robot presence conditions 
completed Nomura, Kanda and Suzuki’s [38] scale measuring negative attitudes toward 
robots, hereafter referred to as NARS scale. The NARS scale was made of three constructs: 
social/future implications (e.g., “I feel that if I depend on robots too much, something bad 
might happen”); emotional attitudes (e.g., “I would feel uneasy if robots really had emotions); 
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and actual interactions (e.g., I would feel very nervous just standing in front of a robot). For 
each dimension, participants rated whether they agreed or disagreed (from 1 to 5).   
2.2.3 Anthropomorphic inferences 
Participants also filled out the humanness scale based on Haslam’s ([18]; see 
Appendix 1) dehumanization taxonomy made of four dimensions: human uniqueness (e.g., 
moral sensibility), animalistic dehumanization (e.g., irrationality), human nature (e.g., 
interpersonal warmth), and mechanistic dehumanization (e.g., inertness). Again, for each 
dimension, participants rated whether they agreed or disagreed (from 1 to 5) to attribute 
related characteristics to the robot being present. We conducted a pretest with 35 participants 
to evaluate the degree of anthropomorphism associated with the robot after either the verbal 
human-robot interaction designed for the experiment (social robot condition) or a simple 
observation of that same robot (non-social robot condition). The results showed a difference 
on mechanical dehumanization, F(1,34) = 7.78, p = .008, η²p = .193, and human nature, 
F(1,34) = 11.59, p = .002, η²p = .261: Participants attributed less mechanical traits and more 
human nature traits (e.g., interpersonal warmth) to the robot in the social robot condition than 
in the non-social robot condition. No effects were found on animal dehumanization and 
human uniqueness attributions (ps>.1).    
 
3 Results  
  3.1 Stroop data                               
Data processing. The data from two participants were discarded because they 
responded randomly (around 50% of accurate responses) in at least one Stroop session. The 
results obtained from the remaining participants are summarized in Table 2 (presented in 
Appendix 2). Errors occurred on 1.6% of the trials and were analysed independently (see 
Appendix 3 for the full analysis of error rates). Correct trials with a reaction time (RT) lower 
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or higher than 3 standard deviations per condition for each participant were considered 
outliers and then removed from RT analyses, which corresponded to 403 trials (1.27% of the 
trials). This filtering procedure has the advantage of taking out extreme values without 
affecting the data of one condition or of one participant in particular.  
 
 
Analysis. We conducted a repeated measure Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
including Sessions (1 and 2), Type of conflict (standard Stroop interference, task conflict, 
semantic conflict, response conflict) as within factors (see also [26, 39]), and Performance 
context (Alone, Non-social robot, and Social robot) as between factor. This analysis revealed 
a significant Session x Type of conflict x Performance context interaction, F(2,115) = 6.14, p 
= .003, η²p = .10 (see Figure 3A and 3D). For the sake of simplicity, Figure 3 (panels A to D) 
shows this interaction in terms of performance improvement from Session 1 to Session 2 on 
standard Stroop interference and each Type of conflict in each Performance context. This 
pattern was examined for standard Stroop interference (A) and each type of conflict (B, C, D) 
taken separately using two orthogonal contrasts according to our expectations: Alone versus 
Non-social robot condition; Social-robot condition versus Alone and Non-social robot 
conditions averaged. Consistent with our expectations, the first contrast was not significant, 
that is, the presence of the non-social robot did not make any difference compared with 
isolation : (A) t(115) = .86, p = .389, η²p = .01; (B) t(115) = .88, p = .379, η²p = .02), (C) 
t(115) = -.05, p = .964, η²p < .01; (D) t(115) = -.38, p = .705, η²p < .01. The second contrast 
proved significant exactly as expected: standard Stroop performance and resolution of 
response conflict improved from Session 1 to Session 2 in the presence of the social robot 
more than in the two other conditions averaged (A) F(2,115) = 7.00, p = .001, η²p = .12; (B) 
F(2,115) = 3.37, p = .038, η²p = .06. This effect was not found on semantic conflict, (C) 
F(2,115) = 1.01, p = .368, η²p < .01, and task conflict, (D) F(2,115) = 1.07, p = .347, η²p = .01. 
15 
As also indicated on Table 2 (bottom; see Appendix 2), performance improvement was 
significant only in the presence of the social robot (ps <. 001 for standard Stroop interference 
and response conflict), with large effect sizes. Thus, although both standard Stroop 
interference and response conflict were significant in the three performance contexts in both 
sessions (all ps≤.001, see Table 2 in Appendix 2), only the presence of the social-robot 
reduced them significantly in Session 2 relative to Session 1. The presence of the non-social 
robot left standard Stroop interference and all types of conflicts unchanged, compared to 
when participants worked alone.  
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Fig. 3 Standard Stroop interference at baseline minus standard Stroop interference in 
experimental session (Alone, Non-Social Robot, Social Robot): the higher the positive value, 
the higher performance improvement in the Stroop Task from baseline (Session 1) to 
experimental session (Session 2). Error bars represent ±1 standard error. *p<.05 
 
3.2 Attitudes toward robots 
 The data related to NARS and humanness scales were examined using MANOVAs 
(one for each scale) with their different constructs entered simultaneously as DVs, and the 
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two robot presence conditions (social vs. non-social robots) as independent variable. The two 
Robot presence conditions did not differ on the three constructs of the NARS scale, 
indicating that there were no more negative attitudes in one condition than in the other: actual 
interactions, F(1, 77) = .67, p = .416, 95% CI  [-.32 ; .42], η²p = .001; emotional attitudes, 
F(1, 77) = -.44, p = .51, 95% CI  [-.30 ; .60], η²p = .006; or social/future implications F(1, 77) 
= 1.401, p = .24, 95% CI [-.16 ; .62], η²p = .018. Interestingly, the reduction of standard 
Stroop interference in the social robot condition, compared to the non-social robot condition, 
remained significant when controlling for participants’ NARS data, F(1, 74) = 5.599, p = 
.021, 95%CI  [5.33 ; 62.14], η²p = .07. 
3.3 Anthropomorphic inferences  
On the humanness scale, the two robot conditions differed significantly from each 
other, multivariate F(4, 74) = 3.18, p = .018, η²p=.15. As expected, participants in the social 
robot condition attributed more human nature characteristics (e.g. interpersonal warmth) 
(univariate F(1, 77) = 5.04, p = .028, 95% CI  [-3.20 ; -.19], η²p = .06) and less mechanical 
features (e.g. e.g., inertness) to the social robot than participants in the non-social robot 
condition (univariate F(1, 77) = 6.84; p = .011; 95% CI  [.71 ; 5.21], η²p = .082). Both groups 
did not differ regarding the two other constructs: human uniqueness, univariate F(1, 77) = 
2.71; p = .104; 95% CI  [-3.70 ; .35], η²p = .034; animalistic dehumanization, univariate F(1, 
77) = .48; p = .489; 95% CI  [-2.77 ; 1.34], η²p = .006. 
3.4 Mediation analyses  
We tested whether the effects found on anthropomorphic inferences mediated the 
impact of robotic presence on standard Stroop performance using the PROCESS plugin in 
SPSS. Not surprisingly, this analysis (see Figure 4A for the whole mediational pattern) 
showed that participants attributed less mechanical traits, (a1) t(77) = -2.96, p = .011, 95% CI 
[-5.21, -.71], and more human nature traits, (a2) t(77) = 2.25, p = .028, 95% CI [.19, 3.20] to 
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the social robot than to the non-social robot. Mechanistic dehumanization was not predictive 
of standard Stroop performance improvement, (b1) t(77) = .813, p = .419, 95% CI [-1.56, 
3.20]. More importantly, the direct effect of robotic presence (social robot vs. non-social 
robot) on standard Stroop performance improvement was no longer significant when 
controlling for mechanistic dehumanization and human nature attributions, indicating a 
complete mediation by anthropomorphic inferences. This effect of robotic presence was fully 
mediated by the attribution of human nature traits to the social robot, (c’) t(77) = -1.48, p = 
.144, 95% CI [-46.18, 6.85], (b2) t(77) = -3.50, p < .001, 95% CI [-10.87, -2.98]; a mediation 
representing more than half, κ2 = 11.74, 95% CI [-27.01, -1.03] of the total effect size 
explained by the model, κ2 = 14.91, 95% CI [-33.54, -.78]. 
The same mediation analysis conducted on response conflict specifically, (c),  (with 
a1, a2 equal to the previous mediation) revealed quite similar findings (see Figure 4B). 
Controlling for the effect of mechanistic dehumanization and human nature attributions, the 
direct effect of robotic presence on response conflict improvement was no longer significant. 
This effect was mediated by the attribution of human nature traits to the social robot, (c’) 
t(77) = -.308, p = .759, 95% CI [-30.30, 22.17], (b2) t(77) = -4.45, p = .05, 95% CI [-8.35, -
.54]. The mediating role of mechanistic dehumanization also proved significant (b1) t(77) = 
2.68, p = .001, 95% CI [.89, 6.11]. These two human nature and mechanistic  
19 
mediations represented, κ2 = 7.53, 95% CI [-20.59, .71] and κ2 = 10.35, 95% CI [-26.68, -
1.41] of the total effect size explained by the model, κ2 = 17.88, 95% CI [-35.02, -5.48].  
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Mediation of the robotic presence effect on standard Stroop performance improvement 
(A) and response conflict improvement (B) by anthropomorphic inferences. 
 
4 Discussion 
There is evidence that attentional mechanisms such as attention focusing can be 
boosted in performance contexts involving the presence of other human agents, either as 
observers or coactors [13]. Performance on the Stroop task, requiring the deployment of 
Performance 
context 
Mechanistic 
dehumanization 
Human nature 
attribution 
Standard 
response conflict 
improvement 
 
a1 = -2.96* 
d21 = -.13 
a2 = 1.81* 
b2 = -5.52* 
b1 = 1.64 
c’ = -4.05 (c = -21.93 *) 
Performance 
context 
Mechanistic 
dehumanization 
Human nature 
attribution 
Standard Stroop 
performance 
improvement 
 
a1 = -2.96* 
d21 = -.13 
a2 = 1.69* 
b2 = -6.93*** 
b1 = 1.07 
c’ = -19.66 (c = -34.57 *) 
A 
B 
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inhibitory control to focus on letter-color cues at the expense of word meaning, is indeed 
typically better under these social circumstances, relative to isolation (e.g., [16, 26, 28]). 
Here, we used an extended version of the Stroop task to specify which component of standard 
Stroop performance is influenced in the presence of humanoid robots, assuming that this 
presence may influence response conflict specifically, as does human presence. Perhaps more 
importantly, we also used a design maximizing anthropomorphic inferences in only one of 
two robotic conditions—a robot presence condition preceded by a verbal interaction with the 
robot (social robot condition) versus the presence of the same robot without any prior verbal 
interaction (non-social robot condition). This strategy made it possible to determine whether 
the beneficial effects of social robotic presence in the Stroop task, if any, reflect the action of 
strictly mechanical distraction or more sophisticated, social-cognitive processes involving 
anthropomorphic inferences. The present findings increase our understanding of robotic 
presence effects in a number of important ways.  
They indeed show that anthropomorphic inferences are needed for the facilitation of 
Stroop performance to occur in presence of a humanoid robot. Again, the passive presence of 
the non-social robot during the Stroop task did not influence performance (neither standard 
Stroop interference nor the different types of conflicts), compared with when participants 
worked in isolation. This passive presence caused a reduction of Stroop interference and 
response conflict exclusively (as expected) when it was preceded by a verbal interaction with 
the robot being present, which also caused anthropomorphic inferences to occur. Taken 
together, these findings run counter a purely mechanistic, non-social approach reducing the 
effects caused by the presence of humanoid robots on attention to the action of physical or 
noise distraction.  
Of particular interest here, whether social presence effects involving the presence of 
human agents can or cannot be reduced to mechanical distraction has long been debated (for 
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a review, see [13]). As noted earlier in this paper, there is evidence that, when the focal task 
is attention demanding, noise or other mechanical (non-social) sources of distraction can 
induce a conflict between paying attention to the focal task versus the distractor. This conflict 
may threaten the organism with cognitive overload and, ultimately, cause a restriction in the 
range of cue utilization (e.g., [13]), a restriction which can be sufficient for a performance 
facilitation to occur in the Stroop task (by focusing more exclusively on the color letter cues 
than on incongruent words). According to this approach, however, both the presence of a 
social robot as well as non-social robot—whose appearance and presence during task 
performance were strictly identical in both conditions—should have led to better Stroop 
performance, compared with isolation. Instead, Stroop performance improved exclusively in 
the social robot condition, in which anthropomorphic inferences about the robot being present 
were also more likely compared with the non-social robot condition (which did not differ 
from isolation on Stroop performance). Of course, we cannot exclude the possibility that 
anthropomorphic inferences about the social robot made its passive presence during Stroop 
performance more distracting, compared with the presence of its non-social counterpart. 
However, even this possibility implies not to reduce the beneficial effects of the social robot 
to the action of a mechanical (nonsocial) source of distraction. This more basic form of non-
social distraction does not seem to operate at all in our research, otherwise the presence of the 
non-social robot would have also lead to better Stroop performance, compared with isolation, 
eventually to a lesser extent relative to the social robot condition. This is not what happened.  
Further evidence that the effects caused by the presence of the social robot on Stroop 
performance are truly social can be found in the mediation analyses. These analyses 
examined whether participants’ anthropomorphic inferences about the robot mediated (vs. 
simply covaried with) the effects of robotic presence on standard Stroop performance and 
response conflict. In both cases, the direct effect of social robotic presence was not significant 
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when controlling for anthropomorphic inferences, indicating their mediating role. This 
mediating role of anthropomorphic inferences can reasonably be taken as evidence that the 
effects of social robotic presence on attention were indeed social by nature and therefore 
cannot be trivialized or reduced to the action of any other nonsocial sources of distraction.  
 This conclusion is also strengthened by the fact that the presence of the social robot 
had the same impact on Stroop performance as in earlier research with human presence. 
Social robotic presence indeed reduced—rather than increased—standard Stroop interference 
and also improved the resolution of response conflict, specifically (no effects on semantic and 
task conflicts). This performance pattern extends the relevance of the attentional view of 
social facilitation from humans to social robots. According to this view (described earlier in 
this paper), social facilitation phenomena—at least in humans and nonhuman primates— 
should not be restricted to the energization of dominant responses [10]. Instead, considering 
that social presence can also boost attention focusing, even when this process requires the 
deployment of inhibitory control (as in Stroop’s paradigm), this attentional view leads to a 
more complex picture. This picture is even more complex when considering that the 
deployment of top-down inhibitory control can also be impaired rather than facilitated in 
contexts where the presence of others represents a potential threat to be monitored [15, 20], 
with negative consequences on learning and other complex tasks relying heavily on executive 
control resources.  
Spatola et al. [40] provided preliminary evidence that Stroop performance can also be 
facilitated-rather than impaired—in the presence of a « bad robot » responding with 
contempt, and lack of empathy, and producing negative evaluations about human 
intelligence. However, whether this bad robot was really threatening, or on the contrary 
challenging, remains unclear (this robot was associated with feelings of discomfort but this 
does not necessarily mean that participants felt threatened by its presence). Spatola et al.’s 
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[40] research also left open two important questions. Because of limitations in the type of 
Stroop stimuli that were used, the locus or type of Stroop conflict (task conflict, semantic 
conflict, response conflict) impacted by robotic presence remained unspecified. Second, 
because of its design, Spatola et al.’s [40] research could not specify the exact role of 
anthropomorphic inferences in the influence of social robotic presence on Stroop 
performance. By demonstrating that this presence can influence Stroop performance as does 
human presence—facilitating standard Stroop performance and resolution of response 
conflict specifically— and that this influence is mediated by anthropomorphic inferences, the 
present findings represent interesting advances.  
Finally, the present research has its own limitations. It indicates that social robotic 
presence can boost attention focusing even when this process requires the deployment of 
inhibitory control, but this conclusion is limited to the Stroop task. Future research should 
clarify whether this finding can be replicated with a variety of tasks in which successful 
performance requires the deployment of executive resources. Likewise, special attention 
should be paid to the boundary conditions of the beneficial effects found in the present 
research. Given earlier findings on executive control in humans and nonhuman primates 
faced with the presence of potentially threatening others [15, 20], these beneficial effects 
seem unlikely in contexts where social robots are themselves perceived—rightly or 
wrongly—as threatening. Of course, robots designed to live with us are not designed to be 
threatening, but their impact on attentional mechanisms and behavior in general may strongly 
depends on what people come to believe (anthropomorphic inferences) about them. This is a 
critical issue for future research in social robotics. As in human-human interactions, a broad 
range of elements, internal or external to interpersonal relationships, can impact how people 
perceive and judge robots. A lot of works remain to be done in this area. For now, in line with 
the Computers Are Social Actors theory [41], our research supports the proposal that people 
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may understand and relate to machines as to fellow creatures. Humans indeed tend to apply 
the same social scripts (specifying actions to produce in various social situations [42]) in 
human-robots interactions as in human-human interactions [43]. This tendency may be 
strengthened by the physical presence of the artificial agent and its humanoid shape as this 
shape provides more social cues to the observer [44, 45]. The more a robot is human-like, the 
less interaction should be needed to energize anthropomorphism and thus social presence 
effects [43, 44]. The relative adequacy between the advanced technological shape and the 
level of perceived capacities of a robot could also play an important role [46]. If the 
expectations induced by the appearance of the robot in terms of capacities are not fulfilled, it 
may result in disappointment, and less anthropomorphic attributions [47]. In this context, the 
fact that the presence of social robots can impact processes as fundamental as attentional 
control adds further reasons to pay special attention to the psychological, sociological, and 
philosophical impact of human-robotic interactions.  
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Appendix 1 
For each following proposition, please note your level of agreement on the scale by 
surrounding the corresponding number (1 to 7). 1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree. 
There are neither good nor bad answers, only your personal opinion interests us. This 
questionnaire and its answers will remain totally anonymous. 
 
These traits are associated to the robot: 
 
Civilized 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
Refined 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
Moral 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
Rational 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
Mature 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
Lack of culture 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
Coarse 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
Amoral 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
Irrational 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
Childlike 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
Emotional  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
Warm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
Cognitively open 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
Autonomous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
Deep 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
Insensible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
Cold 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
Psychorigid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Passive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
Superficial 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Appendix 2 
Table 2 
Mean correct response times (in milliseconds), standard deviations (in parentheses) and error 
rates as a function of the Type of stimuli, Stroop session, and Performance context 
 
    
Performance context 
  
  Alone Non-social Robot Social Robot  
    Session 1 Session 2 Session 1 Session 2 Session 1 Session 2 
Standard color-incongruent 
774 748 783 782 808 768 
(125) (104) (133) (107) (117) (101) 
1.6 0.8 2.03 1.25 1.49 1.28 
Associated color-incongruent 
734 713 742 756 744 743 
(84) (83) (115) (112) (87) (88) 
1.23 1.5 1.88 1.46 1.28 1.5 
Color-neutral words 
731 709 742 755 736 745 
(87) (81) (102) (114) (89) (89) 
1.17 1.30 2.24 1.98 1.23 1.63 
Color-neutral letter strings 
726 709 734 748 740 740 
(81) (84) (96) (107) (84) (86) 
1.98 1.22 2.13 1.93 1.44 1.44 
Standard Stroop 
interference 
F statistic F(1, 38)=15.78 F(1, 38)=22.62 F(1, 39)=24.62 F(1, 39)=15.83 F(1, 38)=62.05 F(1, 38)=13.66 
P value p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 
Effect size η²p=.29 η²p=.37 η²p=.39 η²p=.29 η²p=.62 η²p=.26  
Standard Stroop 
interference evolution 
between sessions 
F statistic F(1, 38)=.33 F(1, 39)=2.09 F(1, 38)=32.17 
P value p=.569 p=.156 p<.001 
Effect size η²p<.01 η²p=.06 η²p=.46 
Response conflict 
F statistic F(1, 38)=13.61 F(1, 38)=15.36 F(1, 39)=22.34 F(1, 39)=15.67 F(1, 38)=52.96 F(1, 38)=19.50 
P value p=.001 p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 
Effect size η²p=.26 η²p=.29 η²p=.36 η²p=.29 η²p=.58 η²p=.34 
Response conflict 
evolution between 
sessions 
F statistic F(1, 38)=.37 F(1, 39)=2.67 F(1, 38)=17.94 
P value p=.545 p=,110 p<.001 
Effect size η²p=.01 η²p=.06 η²p=.32 
Semantic conflict 
F statistic F(1, 38)=.39 F(1, 38)=1.04 F(1, 39)=.004 F(1, 39)=.031 F(1, 38)=4.03 F(1, 38)=.35 
P value p=.536 p=.315 p=.950 p=.862 p=.052 p=.557 
Effect size η²p=.01 η²p=.03 η²p<.01 η²p<.01 η²p=.10 η²p=.01 
Semantic conflict 
evolution between 
sessions 
F statistic F(1, 38)=.03 F(1, 39)=.03 F(1, 38)=3.31 
P value p=.861 p=.868 p=.077 
Effect size η²p<.01 η²p<.01 η²p=.08 
Task conflict 
F statistic F(1, 38)=.66 F(1, 38)=.01 F(1, 39)=2.93 F(1, 39)=.78 F(1, 38)=.83 F(1, 38)=.67 
P value p=.422 p=.926 p=.095 p=.383 p=.369 p=.418 
Effect size η²p=.02 η²p<.01 η²p=.07 η²p=.02 η²p=.02 η²p=.02 
Task conflict evolution F statistic F(1, 38)=.52 F(1, 39)=.02 F(1, 38)=2.00 
37 
between sessions P value p=.476 p=.892 p=.166 
Effect size η²p=.01 η²p<.01 η²p=.05 
 
 
  
38 
Appendix 3 
Error rates 
We conducted the same repeated measure analysis as before (RTs) on error rates (see 
Table 2 in Appendix 2 for error rates). No interaction effects were found either on Session x 
Type of conflict x Performance context interaction, F(2,115) = .20, p = .816, η²p < .01, the 
Session x Type of conflict, F(2,115) = .20, p = .659, η²p < .01, the Session x Performance 
context, F(2,115) = 1.78, p = .173, η²p = .03 and the Type of conflict x Performance context 
interactions, F(2,115) = .41, p = .667, η²p < .01. Only main effects were significant. 
Participants produced less errors in Session 2 than in Session 1, F(1,115) = 16.60, p < .001, 
η²p = .04. We also found a main effect of the Type of conflict F(3,115) = 51.78, p < .001, η²p 
= .31: While there was no difference between standard Stroop and response conflict, F(1,117) 
= 1.22, p =.272, η²p = .01, and no difference between semantic and task conflicts, F(1,117) = 
.10, p =.751, η²p < .01, the level of interference associated with standard Stroop and response 
conflict averaged was higher than the interference associated with semantic and task conflicts 
averaged, F(1,117) = 83.84, p < .001, η²p = .42. 
 
